Readers of this journal will be more aware than most that drinking has been studied from an array of disciplinary perspectives, attracting interest from anthropologists, psychologists, social historians, economists, literary critics and many others. Recently, however, alcohol also seems to have caught the eye of philosophers. We should hardly be surprised at this: by acting on the mind via the body, alcohol blurs the Cartesian distinction between res extensa and res cogita that has dominated western thought for over four hundred years. Furthermore, while fermentation is a natural process, alcoholic drinks arise from human actions which rely on more or less complex forms of technology. Therefore, they raise important questions about the distinction between nature and the world of made objects. Of course, drink is also simultaneously a source of both pleasure and harm: it foregrounds the problems of distinguishing between control and excess, virtue and vice, and -in the case of addiction -between vice and disease. It is, therefore, an eminently philosophical thing.
Three books have recently sought to tackle the thorny question of how to consider alcohol from a philosophical perspective. Beer and Philosophy (ed. Stephen Hales) and Wine and Philosophy (ed. Fritz Allhoff) are companion books which, along with Food and Philosophy, constitute what the publishers describe as an "Epicurean trilogy." Each contains essays either exploring a philosophical problem directly associated with the drink in question, or investigating philosophical themes more broadly through the lens of wine or beer. While most contributors are philosophy professors with a particular interest in the subject, winemakers, brewers, journalists and lawyers also provide chapters, adding a wide range of perspectives. The British philosopher Roger Scruton's I drink therefore I am is an impassioned defence of wine delivered with the combination of wit, erudition and spleen that has become a hallmark of Scruton's work over the years. It seeks not only to legitimize wine-drinking from a philosophical perspective but also to demonstrate that wine-drinking (albeit of a somewhat rarified kind) can be the catalyst for unique and important modes of philosophical engagement. Between them these three books pose an array of fascinating, difficult and sometimes contentious questions about the philosophical implications of drinking and, while all the authors concerned are keen to maintain a degree of levity, they nevertheless demonstrate that such questions matter.
The fact that all three books focus on specific drinks rather than alcohol per se is not incidental to the arguments they present, for while chemistry and biology tell us that alcohol is alcohol, whatever medium it occupies, philosophy appears resistant to the distinction of substance and essence in this regard. For all the writers here -and Scruton more than any -alcohol is most definitely not something that can be meaningfully abstracted from the specific drink via which it is consumed. One consequence of this approach is that, in all three books, taste as opposed to intoxication is the primary object of inquiry. This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, foregrounding taste implies that the defining feature of alcoholic drinks is their effect on the palate, not on the brain; that intoxication is a secondary effect of wine or beer and a secondary cause of their attractiveness to drinkers. Secondly, questions of taste are, unavoidably, questions of cultural knowledge and -to use a more problematic term -cultural capital. Anthropologists have long realized that intoxication cannot be abstracted from cultural contexts, and what is true for drunken comportment is surely even truer for taste and aesthetic judgment. What these books demonstrate (sometimes implicitly) is that drinking is not a 'pure' philosophical problem: it is one where the philosophical questions are also inescapably sociological and anthropological.
auThenTiciTy anD qualiTy The essays in both Wine and Philosophy and Beer and Philosophy tend to revolve around a small, but important, set of questions. Some address the problem of authenticity: what, for example, is real beer, and does this have ethical implications? Others focus on quality: are there, for instance, universal criteria for distinguishing between good and bad wine, and how might we discover what those criteria are? This leads to further speculation on aesthetics, specifically whether or not wine can be considered the proper object of aesthetic pleasure and judgment. Finally, there is the problem of language: is taste an experience beyond language, or is it always bound by the linguistic terms through which we make sense of taste to ourselves and by which we communicate taste experiences to others?
Beer and Philosophy dwells primarily on the relationship between authenticity and quality. Whether or not beer is "authentic" is something that matters to many beer enthusiasts. In Britain, for instance, the leading promoter of traditional brewing techniques is the Campaign for Real Ale (though ped-ants may query whether, historically speaking, real ale can contain hops). Quibbles aside, it is clear that the importance of authenticity in beer discourse raises genuine questions about ontology (what is it to be "beer"?), epistemology (what can we know about beer?) and ethics (how can we make judgments about beer?). For many beer aficionados, good beer is real beer -so questions of being and value are, effectively, collapsed into one. While beer fanatics may debate the relative qualities of Orval, Butcombe or Anchor Steam Beer, they will usually agree that their antithesis is branded lager. The antagonism towards mass-produced lager is palpable throughout Beer and Philosophy, with many contributors taking sideswipes at what one bluntly calls "really pale fizzy horse-piss" (Hales ed., 2007: 66) . Beer-lovers usually put this lack of quality down to the fact that such lager is mass-produced and, ipso facto, "inauthentic." However, authenticity and quality actually pose two distinct questions which need to be addressed separately. Firstly, what are the criteria for defining "real" beer? Secondly, are there actually any universal measures by which quality can be judged?
Many essays in Beer and Philosophy directly tackle these questions. In seeking to define authenticity, some (e.g. Dale Jacquette and Garrett Oliver) appeal to the kinds of traditions codified in laws such as the German beer purity laws (the Reinheitsgebot), or revivified by the Campaign for Real Ale. Of course, this raises the question of whether tradition is identical with authenticity. Is Carling Black Label less authentically beer than more recent "real ales" such as Sharpe's Doombar, or is it just less authentically a "traditional" beer? 1 Furthermore, if it "can be safely said that the universal worldwide estimation of [mass-market lagers] is that they are of poor quality" (Hales ed., 2007: 66) then how do we explain the enormous popularity of mass-produced lager without simply asserting that millions of drinkers have inferior taste buds? If, as Michael Lynch concludes, the "truth" about beer is that "X is a good beer relative to initial standards S just when reasonable beer drinkers would judge it, in light of those standards, to be a good beer in ideal beer-tasting conditions" (Hales ed., 2007: 50) , then how can we be certain we know the difference between a reasonable drinker and the kind of "slack-jawed yokel" (Hales ed., 2007:103) whose preference for canned lager we can ignore?
Stephen Hales appeals to John Stuart Mill's principle of 'higher pleasures' and "competent judges" to resolve this issue. For Mill, the point of social progress was to create the conditions in which an increasing portion of humanity would pursue "higher pleasures" rather than base gratifications. In determining what those "higher pleasures" were, Mill argued that they were those agreed to be higher by "competent judges." To many readers, however, Mill's definition of a "competent judge" can look rather like anyone who concurred with his own definition of "higher pleasures" -making his whole argument dangerously circular. Because his scope is narrower than Mill's, Hales' appeal to expertise is more cogent: beer enthusiasts may very well concur on the competence of the likes of Michael Jackson or Roger Protz. This is because beer enthusiasts tend to be people for whom certain qualities of beer matter and Jackson, Protz and others have demonstrated their ability to identify and describe those qualities effectively. Consequently, Hales concludes that "there are, quite simply, beer experts and therefore they, unequivocally, know what makes a good beer" (Hales ed., 2007:104) . But this still leaves us wondering why so many people prefer canned lager to craft beer. Mill, Hales shows, would give two explanations: those who persist in enjoying Miller Lite either lack sufficient experience to know better (i.e. they lack knowledge), or just don't feel like drinking a challenging Belgian beer when a cold, plain lager will do (i.e. they lack the will to develop their tastes).
Elsewhere, Michael Lynch, Peter Machamer and Matt Dunne pursue the question of whether there are universal or objective judgments to be made about taste. Dunne argues that while beer judgments involve some "realist" elements (e.g. what strain of yeast is used, whether it is top or bottom fermented), they more often rely on "conventionalist" classifications (it tastes like stout, or mild, or India Pale Ale), which are based on criteria that are not absolutely fixed. Machamer points out that while there may be objective flavour compounds in beer, the enjoyment or non-enjoyment of those flavours are subject to such variations of context and personal taste as to make beer discourse something better understood as a form of pedagogy (I like this, and I'll try and teach you why you should too) than a process of objective evaluation. Lynch paraphrases Socrates to draw up a distinction between beer realists (those who assume people like X because it is a good beer) and beer relativists (those who assume that X is a good beer because people like it). However, while broadly accepting the relativist nature of taste, he points out that people do have basic standards by which they judge beer and that these are relatively stable and collectively agreed (e.g. that beer doesn't taste of, say, grapes). Beer experts are simply those who understand those basic, agreed standards to a heightened level of complexity. The pragmatic consequence of this is that their judgments may not apply universally but they reflect the generally agreed sense of what defines beer, and which aspects of beer taste are generally valued, at any one point in history.
The essays on wine ask similar questions. Given the vagaries of taste and experience, can the judgments of even the most respected wine critics ever approach something we could meaningfully describe as "objective"? John Bender suggests that they can on the basis that certain tastes arise only from specific and identifiable chemical compounds and wine tasters are trained specifically to recognize those compounds where they are present (even though their evaluation of those flavours are non-universal). Others, however, note the often absurd inconsistencies in descriptions of identical wines given by different experts and ask whether this proves that, ultimately, wine tasting is a kind of solipsistic pleasure which only appears communicable due to the conventions of wine discourse rather than anything inherent in the experience itself.
DiscouRse anD aesTheTics Indeed, the problem of the relationship between language and experience is one of the most intriguing issues dealt with in these books. Put simply, wine or beer appreciation refers us to the larger question of whether it is possible to have experiences which transcend language -and, if so, what happens when we attempt to communicate those experiences to others. Clearly, we can only verbally communicate experience within the limits of language; however, we also use language inwardly to describe experience to ourselves. Kent Bach argues that while wine discourse is an exemplary instance of how tastes are put into language when we communicate them (and how this tells us more about the politics of communication than about taste), there remains an initial taste experience which precedes language, and which language can only imperfectly capture. Keith and Adrienne Lehrer, by contrast, argue that perceptions of taste cannot be abstracted from language: not only are our expectations framed in advance by both specific descriptions and our general sense of wine talk, but we make sense of sensory experience through an appeal to language. To a degree, however, these questions -like all questions concerning the relationship between language and experience -are inescapably hypothetical: until we find someone who has no language to taste wine, we simply won't know for certain whether taste transcends language; and even if we did find that person, they would have no language by which to let us know that was the case. Pragmatically, we might simply ask: if there is a moment when taste escapes language, is it ever long enough to actually matter?
Because wine is a complex, man-made sensory stimulus (like painting and music) a number of writers ask whether this means wine can be considered an art form. John Dilworth, for instance, suggests that wine is a "sensory theme, upon which the drinker carries out art-like improvisations" (Allhoff ed., 2007: 91) . This is not dissimilar to the conclusion of Roger Scruton's far-reaching discussion in I Drink Therefore I Am. Concluding that wine is art-like but not an art form proper, Scruton claims the question comes down to one of intentionality and arrangement. Wine, like visual art or music, is the consequence of human intention: someone works to produce something that can be experienced by somebody else. However, as Scruton puts it, "we don't taste the intention in wine, as we hear the intention in music" (61). Why not? Because tastes, unlike sounds (or colours, or shapes) cannot be intentionally arranged or ordered according to any recognized or shared schema. Sounds can be ordered by pitch into notes which are recognized as higher or lower, dissonant or melodious. They can be arranged harmonically and ordered through time to create anything from simple melodies to complex symphonic architecture. Because there is no such concrete measurable relation between tastes, they cannot "generate expectation, harmony, suspension or release" (122). Without the capacity to be arranged architecturally, so to speak, tastes (and, therefore, wine) cannot communicate intention in ways which make it the proper subject of aesthetic judgment.
Ultimately, in fact, Scruton concludes that it does not really matter whether you "are disposed to describe the enjoyment of wine as 'aesthetic'. What matters is the cognitive status of wine -its status as an object of thought and a vehicle of reflection" (p. 122). For Scruton, wine -specifically wine -opens up the mind through a unique relationship between taste and the imagination. Scruton is a confirmed terroiriste, and for him the meaning of wine is absolutely bound to its place of production: to judge a wine by taste and aroma alone "is like thinking you can judge a Chinese poem by its sound, without knowing the language" (p. 34). However, that all-important place is best visited not in person (travel, Scruton drily observes, "narrows the mind"), but through the imagination of the drinker. A glass of wine, Scruton suggests, should be the occasion for a kind of reverie in which the drinker contemplates the geography, history and labour that is mysteriously captured in the liquid being tasted. This expresses a respect for place not contaminated by the shallow gaze of the tourist, though it also implies the presence of a cultivated (indeed, well-travelled) mind which is capable -and desirous -of conjuring up visions of Burgundian churchyards or Provençal forts at the whiff of a fresh Beaujolais or well-aged Châteaneuf-du-Pape. In the end, Scruton asserts that wine is philosophically valuable because it does something other art forms can't do: it makes us more deeply aware of our connection to both place and history while encouraging a perspective on that relationship which reminds us that our relationship to the actualities of existence is mediated by the imagination. culTuRe anD iDenTiTy These discussions are extremely valuable: in many ways, they get to the heart of what we are doing when we evaluate made objects and why that experience matters to us. However, one of the most significant features of wine discourse is that it reflects how people define themselves socially as much as any combination of flavour compounds that are contained in a particular drink. Does it matter whether or not a particular wine tastes of cigar boxes, cherries or cut grass? Would a Martian with a refined set of tastebuds care? Maybe, but it is unlikely he'd care half as much as the host of a dinner party who had cracked open that bottle in an attempt to please their guests. And this isn't because cigar boxes or cut grass taste especially nice (or even, as Bach suggests, because those are necessarily accurate descriptions), but because being able to say that you recognize those tastes is a way of saying you have the knowledge to do so, and the fact that you have the knowledge to do so says something about who you are. It is, in other words, an expression of cultural capital: a way of defining yourself socially through the demonstration of your cultural sophistication. Scruton writes that wine 'is not just the object of pleasure, but an object of knowledge; and that pleasure depends on the knowledge' (p. 22). However, fine wine is by any measure expensive, so the acquisition of the requisite knowledge requires, implies and -for some people -demonstrates access to particular levels of disposable income. This doesn't mean that all wine appreciation is a form of conspicuous consumption, but it does mean we can't realistically divorce the aesthetics of wine from the fact that it can also operate as a marker of cultural status.
In Wine and Philosophy, Justin Weinberg tackles precisely this issue. Looking at the problem from an economic perspective, Weinberg defines fine wine as a "Veblen good": that is, a commodity whose attraction increases with its cost -for the sole (and, in Weinberg's view, irrational) reason that it provides a means of conspicuous consumption. However, conspicuous consumption is not the only way of expressing cultural status. Arguably, the whole register of wine discourse serves to give one style of drinking the imprimatur of elite cultural reference points. The tendency among some drinkers to draw conspicuous parallels between wine-drinking and high-cultural practices such as art appreciation, listening to classical music and reading canonical literature is illustrated in Steve Charters' focus group work with Australian wine-drinkers. When drinkers claim "there is a point of similarity there. Music or art, theatre or all those sorts of things" (Allhoff ed., 2007:195) it may tell us that wine drinking is an aesthetic experience -or it may demonstrate that describing the pleasures of wine in these terms is just something certain types of consumers do. It is not, from this perspective, incidental that essays in Beer and Philosophy are marked by consciously middle-brow cultural reference points, while those in Wine and Philosophy gravitate the other way. For Scruton, this a point of principle: wine matters precisely because it encapsulates the kind of disappearing cultural values encapsulated in other "elite" art forms. Whatever one's view on this, it also demonstrates the extent to which alcohol (in all its forms) speaks to the politics of identity as much as to the philosophy of language or aesthetics.
"inToxicaTion" anD DRunkenness Taken together, these books provide an array of timely meditations on subjectivity and universality, the limits of language, and the nature of sensory perception. Surprisingly, however, they have less to say on the key distinguishing feature shared by wine and beer -which is their capacity to intoxicate. Intoxication is treated with circumspection in both Wine and Philosophy and Beer and Philosophy. Occasionally it is alluded to as something that matters because, in its mildest form, it either enhances taste or emboldens drinkers to explore their capacity to discuss taste in new ways. Its role in the formation of friendships is discussed by Jason Kawall -but only to reassert that true friendships cannot be founded on beer-drinking partnerships. David Hilbert uses the sensory experience of drinking a cold beer to elegantly explain the key points of Bishop Berkeley's idealism; however, we don't discover what the philosophical implications of drinking, say, five cold beers may be for Berkeley's claim that "to be is to be perceived" given that perception will probably be fairly distorted at that point. Steven M. Bayne uses the "beer goggles" effect as the springboard for a very lucid discussion of Kantian epistemology. Elsewhere, however, it might have been interesting to see a discussion of drunkenness in relation to Kant's influential claims about the relationship between reason, freedom and moral capacity. Kant, for instance, believed that one could not be held responsible for actions committed when drunk because in "imputation the action must spring from freedom," and a drunk, being irrational, was not free (Kant, 1997: 80-1) .
Roger Scruton does tackle the question of intoxication at length, and in doing so demonstrates an intriguing, if idiosyncratic, understanding of the term. He begins with a neat inversion of in vino veritas, arguing instead that intoxication is a human need because we require the capacity to escape our inner (often darker) selves in order to get on together. This amicably illusive intoxication is social, discursive and decidedly civilized: it arises only through "the social drinking of wine, during or after a meal, and in full cognizance of its delicate taste and aroma" (p. 3) and it demonstrates its value through heightened conversation. Later, however, intoxication becomes more solitary. In the chapter "Conscious and Being," Scruton states that "wine, properly drunk, transfigures the world at which you look, illuminating that which is precisely most mysterious in the contingent beings surrounding you, which is the fact that they are -and also that they might not be" (p. 115). Intoxication here is compared to the meditative consciousness of Hinduism -suggesting the virtues of wine drinking can also be strictly non-discursive.
Elsewhere wine intoxication is compared to the "intoxication" of poetry, with both standing as a kind of "relishing" rather than a loss of control or reason. This raises an interesting semantic point, since to describe poetry as "intoxicating" is to deploy an image culled from drunkenness. Although the word "intoxication" has come to mean, in special cases, a kind of exhilaration, its earliest uses in this sense were dependent on an understanding of its meaning as a synonym for drunkenness.
2 Therefore, to describe alcohol intoxication as like the intoxication of poetry risks putting the metaphorical cart before the horse. Scruton resolves this problem by insisting that wine intoxication (when wine is properly drunk by the right kind of people) is absolutely and fundamentally distinct from other kinds of intoxication, writing that the intoxication "we experience through wine … is neither a tame version nor a premonition of drunkenness" (p. 118).
Scruton's antithetical uses of the term "intoxication" has some parallels with the use of the term Rausch -usually translated as "intoxication" -in Friedrich Nietzsche's writing on art. As Rex Welshon points out in his contribution to Beer and Philosophy, Nietzsche's uses of the term intoxication appears, at first, deeply contradictory. On the one hand Nietzsche routinely castigates the role of alcohol in the narcotisation of European culture, while on the other he insists that "for art to exist, for any sort of aesthetic activity or perception to exist, a certain psychological precondition is indispensable: intoxication" (Nietzsche, 2003: 82) . As Welshon points out, however, this reflects a distinction drawn by Nietzsche between "pathological" and "Dionysian" intoxication. Pathological intoxication (usually in the form of drunkenness) is a temporary escapism that is characteristic of "the herd," and which merely reaffirms conventional morality by providing a bracketed, guilt-ridden transgression of it. Dionysian intoxication, by contrast, is the exhilaration -the rush -felt when one experiences being in ways no longer bound by the pinched, calculating and anxious mind-set of everyday life. Welshon argues that this intoxication can be experienced wherever a combination of expertise, attention and Will allow the individual to become one, as it were, with their immediate environment: "whether it's soccer, skiing, brewing beer, cooking, sex, intellectual activity, connoisseurship of any kind, walking (of which Nietzsche was fond), intoxication is a possible, and desirable, accompaniment" (Hales ed., 2007: 216) . Critically, however, Nietzsche's Dionysian intoxication was less, not more, likely to be achieved with the aid of drink or drugs.
Scruton and Nietzsche both celebrate something called "intoxication," but which is not intoxication as commonly understood: not that altered state of mind brought about by the ingestion of intoxicating substances. This unwillingness to ascribe positive value to commonplace intoxication is also reflected in most of the essays in both Beer and Philosophy and Wine and Philosophy. Mild intoxication tends to be viewed positively only when it heightens an already valuable experience: stimulating the senses in the presence of complex tastes; heightening already sophisticated conversation; triggering already cultivated philosophical reflections and so forth. Intoxication -or, more plainly, drunkenness -is never identified has having its own intrinsic value. Indeed, it is rarely presented as something to which the question of value even applies.
The salient exception to this is the opening essay in Wine and Philosophy by Harold Tarrant. Tarrant starts from the principle that intoxication -not taste -is the distinguishing feature of wine and he explores what this meant for the role of wine in Classical Greek culture. His conclusion is intriguing, and perhaps points the way for a philosophically informed critique of hedonistic drinking today. Intoxication, Tarrant suggests, was embraced by the Greeks, and incorporated into the rituals of everyday life, precisely because it was a natural power that existed in the world. However, this embrace was also a struggle for control over both self and nature:
When they were confronted by natural power of any kind, the Greeks desired to harness it, eliminating from their world as far as possible all that was unpredictable and beyond human control. Like Odysseus, every adult Greek male with wine at his disposal was faced with the challenge of getting it to work for him rather than against him. (Allhoff ed., 2007:17) The Greek symposium, where male citizens would drink wine while discussing philosophy and politics, demonstrates this well. The symposium, as Scruton also notes, involved the demonstration of control: drink was expected to have an effect, but that effect was to be managed by the drinker so as to produce positive, rather than negative, results. Everything from the ritu-alisation of drinking behaviour to the design of the drinking vessels pointed towards to centrality of controlled intoxication in symposiastic culture. In Plato's Symposium Socrates doesn't drink less than his peers, but he drinks better; "rather than succumbing to the drink, Socrates controls it" (Allhoff ed., 2007: 23) . Tarrant suggests that wine presented a test of expertise for the Greeks; however, this was not the expertise of taste but the expertise of control over oneself (and it was not a test to be avoided, as Euripedes' Bacchae warns in the most brutal terms). The implication of this is that drinking wine was not primarily a sensory experience with secondary intoxicating effects; rather, wine was an intoxicant which, fortuitously, could induce pleasurable taste sensations as well.
While the ancient Greeks in no way resolved the riddle of intoxication, it could be argued that its status in contemporary society is more paradoxical then ever (one need only look at the extraordinary role of "celebrity rehab" in popular culture to see this paradox in action). While public health professionals seek to quantify intoxication through unit-based measures of safe, hazardous and harmful drinking and while sociologists explore the "calculated hedonism" that seems to characterize the drinking of some (but by no means all) young people, perhaps there is an important role for philosophers in returning to the ancient question of what, exactly, intoxication is. Is it a singular phenomenon or something radically dependent on mode (as well as level) of consumption, environment, attitude and so forth? Is drunkenness, as Seneca claimed, a kind of "voluntary madness," or was Ernest Hemingway right when he wrote that "a man does not exist until he is drunk" (Baker, 1969: 155) ? These kinds of questions are not the sole preserve of philosophy, but it can do no harm for philosophers to give their perspective on them. Furthermore, it can only help the rest of us to better penetrate the complexities of philosophical speculation when otherwise arcane concepts are explained using something as familiar as a glass of wine or a pint of beer. Wine and philosophy, Beer and philosophy and I drink therefore I am show how fruitful this kind of investigation can be, we can only hope there is more to come in future. enDnoTes 1. British brewers were some of the first industrialists to develop techniques of mass production and distribution in the late eighteenth century and hopped beer was itself once viewed as 'but an upstart and a foreigner' (Taylor, 1637: np) .
2. The Oxford English Dictionary cites Thomas Addison's use of the phrase 'secret intoxication of pleasure' as the earliest use of the word in this sense. Addison, however, was commenting on Book 9 of Milton's Paradise Lost where Adam and Eve eat the Forbidden Fruit. Here Milton himself uses drunkenness as his metaphor: 'As with new wine intoxicated both / They swim in mirth, and fancy that they feel / Divinity within them breeding wings' (1008-10).
